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TRANSFER OF RIGHTS UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ADULTHOOD WITH ABILITY 
OR DISABILITY? 
Deborah Rebore* & Perry Zirkel** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) re-
quires each state to provide a Free Appropriate Public Educa-
tion (FAPE) to all children with disabilities, ages three to 
twenty-one, living within its borders. 1 Under the Act, parents2 
are entitled to extensive participation in the planning of their 
child's education. For example, the student's parent is a re-
quired member of the Individualized Education Program (IEP) 
team.3 Furthermore, the IDEA provides the student's parent 
with several procedural safeguards, including the right to initi-
ate a due process hearing for matters arising under the IDEA, 
such as issues related to eligibility and services.4 Indeed, a 
* Deborah Rebore is a Graduate Research Fellow at Lehigh University. She 
Received her B.A. in 1990 from Colby College and her J.D. from from Catholic Univer-
sity's Columbus School of Law. 
** Perry Zirkel is the lacocca Professor of Education at Lehigh University, where 
he has served as the dean of College of Education. He has a Ph.D. in Educational Ad-
ministration, aa J.D. from the University of Connecticut, and a Master of Laws from 
Yale University. He has written over 750 publications on various aspects of school law 
and is a frequent presenter across the country. 
1. See 20 U.S. C.§ 1412 (2)(B) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1999). 
2. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.20 (1999). "Parent" includes biological and adoptive par-
ents, guardians, a person acting in the place of a parent, surrogate parents, and if per-
mitted by state law, foster parents. 
3. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(iii) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a)(1) (1999). 
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1997). Additionally, parents have the right to examine their 
child's records under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1997) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.562(1999), 
limit disclosure of records under 34 C.F.R. § 300.571 (1999), and to withhold consent 
for an initial evaluation and initial provision of services under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(c) 
(1997) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.505(a)(i)-(ii) (1999). As of the 1997 Amendments, parents 
have the right to participate in all meetings regarding identification, evaluation, 
placement, and FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (1997). 
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parent's involvement in the entire process may significantly in-
fluence the type and level of educational services that the stu-
dent receives. 
A potential dilemma regarding a parent's role under the 
IDEA arises when the student attains the age of majority. 
Generally, age of majority status entitles a person to various 
rights, such as the right to vote and to contract. 5 However, at-
taining the age of majority does not automatically entitle an 
IDEA-eligible student to adult rights, at least in terms of edu-
cational decision-making. Instead, the IDEA appears to pre-
sume that these students do not acquire educational rights. Al-
though the Act, as amended in 1997, permits states to transfer 
rights formerly held by the parent to the age of majority stu-
dent,6 the awkward legislation language seems to suggest that 
a student only obtains such rights if the state has enacted 
transfer legislation. Further, the general statutory right to 
have and control access to educational records, 7 which trans-
fers to all students at the age of eighteen, 8 arguably remains 
with the IDEA-parent unless the state has transferred IDEA 
rights to the student.9 
Surprisingly, little has been written on this topic. 10 One 
commentator has addressed the issue twice, once before and 
once after the 1997 Amendments. However, both articles are 
brief and written in question and answer format, lacking an 
in-depth analysis of issues related to the transfer of rights from 
parents to age of majority IDEA-eligible students. 11 A third re-
view, written subsequent to the 1997 Amendments, warned of 
the potential for litigation in the transfer of rights; but again, 
the article is brief and does not examine interrelated issues. 12 
5. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.28.015 (West 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
14-1-101 (Michie 1999). Although educational decision-making is not typically men-
tioned, it can be inferred as a matter of common law, unless otherwise provided by 
statute. 
6. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.517 (1999). 
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 99.5(a) (1999) 
8. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.574(b) (1999). 
9. See id. § 300.574(c). On the other hand, the bright-line rule of the FERPA 
regulations and the IDEA legislative mandate that states act "in accordance" with 
FERPA arguably suggest a contrary conclusion. 34 C.F.R. § 99.5(a); 20 U.S.C. § 
1417(c). 
10. A law review search on Lexis revealed no articles specific to this subject. 
11. See Zvi Greismann, Q & A: What Would You Do?, 12 THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR 
3 (1996); Zvi Greismann, Q & A, 14 THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR 6 (1998). 
12. See Transferring Rights to 18-Year-Olds Under the New IDEA, 14 THE 
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This article provides a current and comprehensive analysis 
of the status of age of majority students under the IDEA. Part I 
discusses the status of parents, vis-a-vis age of majority stu-
dents, under the IDEA prior to the 1997 amendments. Part II 
analyzes the new relevant provisions in the 1997 amendments 
and the 1999 regulations, which allow states to transfer the 
procedural rights from parents to age of majority students. 
Part III outlines various potential problems that states should 
consider when determining whether and how to implement this 
transfer of rights. 
II. PRE-1997 LAW 
Prior to the 1997 amendments, the IDEA was silent with 
respect to the procedural rights of age of majority students. 
Consequently, states were left without guidance concerning 
this perplexing issue. While few states enacted legislation 
transferring rights to IDEA-eligible students upon their 
reaching the age of majority, 13 others left the issue unresolved. 
When disputes concerning the legal status and procedural 
rights under IDEA of parents vis-a-vis age of majority students 
arose, hearing officers and judges relied on other relevant lan-
guage in the Act. Notably, there have only been a handful of 
published pertinent decisions. 
In John H. v. MacDonald, the New Hampshire Federal Dis-
trict Court adopted a partial solution for settling such dis-
putes.14 In this case, the defendant school district did not pro-
vide notice of the IEP meeting to either the parents or the 
surrogate parent. 15 At the IEP meeting an eighteen year-old 
student signed a form consenting to his educational placement. 
The school district claimed that because the student had 
reached the age of majority in New Hampshire, the parents 
were not entitled to notice or to participate in the meeting. 16 
The court held that not only "adult students" but also their 
parents (including surrogate parents and legal guardians) were 
SPECIAL EDUCATOR 5 (1998). 
13. See, e.g., WIS. ADMIN. CODE§ 11.16 (1994) (repealed 1999). 
14. 1986-87 EHLR DEC. 558:366 (D.N.H. 1987). 
15. See id. at 369. 
16. See id. In addition, the district claimed that the parents were not entitled to 
notice because a surrogate parent had been appointed to represent the student. The 
surrogate appointment lapsed on the student's 18th birthday. 
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entitled to the IDEA's procedural safeguards, including the 
right to participate in IEP meetings and the right to file for a 
due process hearing_17 
Although the court did not use the term "transfer" in the 
opinion, it simultaneously transferred rights to the student and 
allowed rights to remain with the parents. The court's solution 
is limited for two reasons. First, the court essentially placed 
the age of majority student on an equal footing with the par-
ents. The court did not determine which party would prevail in 
the event of a disagreement between them. Second, in light of 
the 1997 amendments, the court's decision would not likely be 
the same today.18 
A few years later, the Second Circuit addressed a similar 
situation in Mrs. C. v. Wheaton. 19 In Mrs. C., an IDEA-eligible 
student, J.C., who had attained the age of majority, 20 consented 
to the termination of his IDEA services. The school district al-
legedly failed to comply with IDEA's procedural requirements 
by not providing J.C.'s parents or his surrogate parent with no-
tice of, or opportunity to participate in, the meeting in which he 
agreed with school officials to terminate his IDEA placement. 
J.C.'s mother filed suit under the IDEA, challenging the termi-
nation decision.21 The lower court held that since J.C. had at-
tained the age of majority and had not been declared incompe-
tent, his consent was sufficient to terminate the placement, 
regardless of whether his mother or his surrogate parent 
played a role in the decision. 22 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
reversed the lower court's decision. It concluded that Congress 
intended for school districts to comply with the statute's proce-
dural requirements with regard to parents as a prerequisite to 
changing an eligible student's educational placement. Initially, 
17. See id. at 370. The court clarified that both have this right regardless of 
whether the other exercised it. 
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517 (1999); 20 U.S.C. 
1232(g) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 99.5(a) (1999); 34 C.F.R. § 300.574(b)-(c) (1999). 
19. 916 F.2d 69 (2nd Cir. 1990). 
20. See id. at 72. This case arose in Connecticut where the age of majority is 
eighteen. The student was twenty years old when he consented to the termination of 
placement. 
21. See id. at 70-71. Although the court opinion did not address the issue of the 
mother's standing, J.C. was adopted by his grandparents, and at age four was commit-
ted to the Department of Children and Youth Services. Upon J.C.'s return to his 
mother's home, at age 20, she became his conservator. 
22. See id. at 72. 
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the appellate court pointed to the IDEA's procedural safeguard 
entitling a parent to notice of any proposed change in the stu-
dent's IEP.23 The court went on to explain that "the state can-
not terminate an 18-to-21 year-old student's educational 
placement on the latter's 'consent' unless the 'consent' is an in-
formed one, i.e., the [IDEA's] procedural safeguards are fol-
lowed."24 Based on these observations, the court held that in 
the absence of procedural compliance, such as notice to the 
parents, the student's consent was not informed, and was 
therefore not legally effective_25 
This decision offers even less assistance than the earlier 
New Hampshire case for determining whether IDEA-parent's 
rights transfer to an age of majority student. The Mrs. C court 
established that school districts must comply with the IDEA's 
procedural requirements, such as parental notification, before a 
student may provide informed consent regarding an educa-
tional placement. However, the court declined to rule on 
whether a student's informed consent decision was of any ef-
fect. This left open the question of whether the educational 
rights transferred to the student, and if these rights are only 
partially transferred, would the student's decision override the 
parent's?26 
In addition to court decisions, a Wisconsin hearing officer 
decision has been cited for the proposition that parents still re-
tain procedural rights after an IDEA-eligible student reaches 
the age of majority.27 In Unified School District of De Pere,28 al-
though state law clearly transferred procedural rights to the 
eighteen-year-old student, a hearing officer ruled that the stu-
dent's parents had standing to appeal the school district's IEP 
decision under the IDEA.29 This decision, however, relied on 
the fact that the parents "filed their appeal prior to [the stu-
dent's] eighteenth birthday and at that time it was solely their 
right to do so."30 In contrast to the judicial decisions, the hear-
ing officer did not address the issue of parental rights after the 
23. See id. at 73. 
24. !d. at 74. 
25. See id. at 73-7 4. 
26. See id. 
27. See, e.g., Greismann, supra note 11. 
28. 21 IDELR 1206 (Wis. SEA 1994). 
29. See id. at 1207. 
30. !d. (emphasis in original). 
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student reached the age of majority. 
Therefore, the law prior to 1997 offered minimal guidance 
as to whether the parents' rights transferred to an 
IDEA-eligible age of majority student. Moreover, the new pro-
vision in the IDEA overrides any guidance offered in the lim-
ited applicable case law. 
III. 1997 AMENDMENTS AND RESULTING REGULATIONS 
The 1997 amendments to the IDEA specifically address the 
issue of whether an older IDEA-eligible student is entitled to 
rights held by the parent upon reaching the age of majority un-
der state law. Specifically, IDEA 1997 permits states to trans-
fer the parent's rights to the student when the student achieves 
the age of majority. 31 Further, in states that elect to provide for 
this transfer, the school district must give notice of it to both 
the parent and student, via a statement in the IEP, at least one 
year prior to the student's attaining the age of majority.32 Ad-
ditionally, the district must again give notice to the parents 
and the student when the student reaches the age of major-
ity. 33 The amendments also obligate the district to provide both 
the parents and the student with other required parental no-
tices, such as notice of IEP meetings, for as long as the student 
is IDEA eligible.34 Finally, the U.S. Department of Education's 
accompanying regulations clarify that although parents are 
only entitled to notice of IEP meetings, either the student or 
the district may invite the parents to attend.35 
While the amendments grant states the discretion to de-
termine whether to transfer procedural rights to age of major-
ity students, they also impose two limitations on a state's 
authority to do so. First, the amendments categorically exclude 
IDEA-eligible students who are incompetent under state law, 
from obtaining such rights. 36 Second, via a "special rule," the 
amendments similarly exclude students who are otherwise in-
capable of providing informed consent with respect to educa-
31. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a) (1999). 
32. See id. § 300.347(c). 
33. See id. § 300.517(a). 
34. See id. § 300.517(a)(1)(i). 
35. See 64 Fed. Reg. 12,473 (1999). 
36. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a) (1999). 
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tional decisions. 37 
Additionally, for the "special rule" category, the amend-
ments require states that enact transfer statutes to establish 
formal procedures for appointing the parent, or another adult, 
to represent the student for IDEA purposes. 38 However, by only 
cryptically requiring appointment "procedures,"39 IDEA 1997 
does not provide any guidance regarding the criteria and meth-
ods to use in deciding whether the student has the "ability to 
provide informed consent with respect to [her/his] educational 
program."40 The resulting regulations provide some assistance 
by clarifying that before a state uses the special rule, it must 
have some "mechanism"41 in place for determining whether a 
student is capable of providing informed consent. 42 Further, 
the official comments to the regulations provide even greater 
specificity by explaining that the type of "mechanism" used to 
determine whether a student can provide informed consent is 
limited to proceedings for determining "lesser competency."43 
IV. POSSIBLE PROBLEMS 
States need to consider certain policy issues regarding the 
student's legal status before deciding whether, and how, to 
transfer procedural rights to the student. First, a state must 
examine its own surrogate parent law, which supplements the 
surrogate parent provision in the IDEA, to see if it conforms 
with the IDEA transfer provision. Second, a state must deter-
mine whether it wants to amend its age of majority definition 
to include students who are younger than the established 
chronological age but who might be included for other reasons, 
like emancipation. Third, states need to be aware of the laws 
and procedures regarding incompetence. Fourth, states must 
determine whether a mechanism exists for declaring a person 
incapable of providing informed consent for a limited purpose 
37. See id. § 300.517(b). 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. !d. 
41. The regulations do not define the type of mechanism needed in order to utilize 
the special rule. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(b). 
42. See id. 
43. For a discussion of the meaning of "lesser competency," see infra notes 66-70 
and accompanying text. 
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like educational decision making, and if not, whether to create 
such a mechanism. 
Before grappling with these issues, the initial step is to as-
certain whether the age of majority, under state law that ap-
plies to all children, is below the age of twenty-one. If the age of 
majority in the state is twenty-one, 44 the student will reach the 
age of majority when that student's IDEA eligibility ends. Con-
sequently, in such states parents retain their rights under the 
IDEA for as long as the child is eligible for FAPE. However, in 
the vast majority of states, the age of majority is eighteen. 45 In 
these states, lawmakers will have to decide whether to transfer 
parental rights to IDEA-eligible age of majority students. The 
following subsections address these four specified policy issues 
in states where the age of majority is below twenty-one. 
A. Students with a Surrogate Parent 
Emphasizing the importance of parental involvement in the 
student's educational planning, 46 the IDEA defines "parent" to 
include a surrogate parent. 47 A surrogate parent is responsible 
for representing the student in matters related to the student's 
education, which may include identification, evaluation, place-
ment, and F APE. 48 The Act requires the agency responsible for 
the student's education49 to appoint a surrogate parent to par-
ticipate on behalf of the student in the educational planning 
where 1) the parents are unknown, 2) the district is unable, af-
ter reasonable efforts, to locate the parents, or 3) the child is a 
ward of the State_ 5o 
Although the IDEA only specifies three situations where a 
surrogate parent must be appointed, presumably state law may 
add to the list. Indeed, some states require the appointment of 
a surrogate parent in specified additional circumstances. 51 For 
44. See, e.g., 1 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 1991 (1998). 
45. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.993(a)(2) (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12-2A-3(B) (Michie 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 8-1-102(a) (Michie 1999). 
46. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
47. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
48. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1)(2) (1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(1)-(2) (1999). 
49. The responsible agency varies from state to state. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 
7579.5(b) (Deering 1999) (stating that the LEA is responsible for assigning surrogate 
parents); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1161(1) (1999) (stating that the school district is re-
sponsible for assigning surrogate parents). 
50. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a)(1)-(3). 
51. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-c:14(II)(e) (1999) (stating that a surro-
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example, New Hampshire protectively provides for the ap-
pointment of a surrogate in situations where the parents of an 
IDEA-eligible student are "unable to act as the child's advocate 
in the educational decision-making process."52 Other states 
permit the appointment of a surrogate parent in certain situa-
tions. 53 For example, Connecticut allows for the appointment of 
a surrogate if the student is under the supervision of the state 
child protection agency.54 Finally, some states have included 
restrictions. Although it is permissive to appoint a surrogate 
parent in Pennsylvania for "good reason," a surrogate parent 
will not be appointed in cases where a parent is "simply unco-
operative or unresponsive."55 
Since a surrogate parent assumes the role of parent for 
IDEA purposes, in a state that has chosen to transfer rights to 
the student, the assignment of a surrogate parent terminates 
upon reaching the age of majority, unless one of the two IDEA 
exceptions apply. 56 Some states already require the termina-
tion of a surrogate parent assignment on the student's eight-
eenth birthday.57 Other states require that the surrogate par-
ent assignment continue beyond the student reaching the age 
of majority but only in an advisory capacity. 58 States in this 
latter category may need to amend their surrogate appoint-
ment procedures in order to conform to the IDEA. Specifically, 
gate parent shall be appointed where the parent is otherwise unable to act as the 
child's advocate); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit, 18 § 1356(I)(v) (1995) (stating that a surrogate 
parent shall be appointed when the parents are disabled); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
03-050-600(1) (1999) (stating that a surrogate parent shall be appointed where the par-
ent is unwilling to ensure that the student's educational needs are being met); 19 TEX. 
ADMIN. CODE§ 89.1115(g)(1)(C) (West 1998) (stating that a surrogate parent must be 
appointed when a student is committed to the temporary custody of the state). 
52. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 186-c:14(II)(c). 
53. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-94g(a) (1999) (stating that a surrogate parent 
may be appointed with the parent's consent, where the student is committed to the 
temporary custody of the state); 43 S.C. CoDE ANN. REGS. 243(k)(B)(4) (1998) (stating 
that a surrogate may be appointed where the parent is unresponsive, lives a far dis-
tance from the school, or is in jail, with written authorization from the parent). 
54. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-94g(a) (1997). 
55. 22 PA. CODE§ 342.66(a)(II)(A)(2) (1999). 
56. For IDEA transfer exceptions see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
57. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7579.5(a) (Deering 1999) (a surrogate parent 
shall not be appointed for a child who has reached the age of majority, unless declared 
incompetent by a court of law); 18 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-80-80(B)(4)(a) (1998) (assign-
ment of a surrogate terminates when the child attains the age of majority); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 41(c)(iv) (Michie 1999) (appointment of a surrogate parent terminates upon the 
child attaining the age of majority). 
58. See, e.g., IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 511, r.7-9-1(j) (1998). 
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since the IDEA's transfer provision limits the rights of the par-
ent to notice, a parent is not entitled to greater rights, such as 
serving in an advisory capacity. 
Some states still allow a surrogate parent to continue to 
represent the student beyond the age of majority. In these 
states the appointment of the surrogate parent will continue if 
it appears that the student needs parental assistance beyond 
reaching the age of eighteen.59 In Connecticut, a state where 
rights transfer to the student at eighteen, the surrogate parent 
remains assigned to the student unless the student objects in 
writing. If the student does object, the commissioner of educa-
tion is required to hold a hearing to determine whether the 
surrogate assignment will continue.60 
It appears that state laws that require or permit the surro-
gate parent assignment to continue beyond the student's eight-
eenth birthday would be in contravention of IDEA 1997 in 
states, such as Connecticut, which have transferred rights to 
the student. In addition, such laws treat age of majority stu-
dents with surrogate parents differently than those without 
surrogate parents who will obtain IDEA rights unless incompe-
tent or incapable of providing informed consent. Thus, states 
should examine their surrogate parent law in tandem with any 
proposed transfer of rights legislation to make sure that they 
are compatible. 
B. Students Who Are Younger than Eighteen But Legally 
Independent 
The transfer of IDEA rights is permissible when the stu-
dent attains the age of majority. The Act's requirement that a 
statement of the transfer be included in the student's IEP one 
year prior to reaching the age of majority presumes that age of 
majority status is achieved upon reaching a certain age. How-
ever, in some states a child who is younger than the chrono-
logical age defined as the age of majority may still be consid-
ered to have reached it. For example, in Alaska a person who 
59. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C:l4(1V) (1999) (stating that the ap-
pointment of a surrogate may be extended by the commissioner until child graduates or 
reaches 21); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1115(g)(1)(E) (West 1998) (stating that ap-
pointment of a surrogate can continue up until the student turns 22 if necessary to en-
sure FAPE). 
60. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-94g(b) (1997). 
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has married has attained the age of majority. 61 As a result, 
IDEA-eligible married students in Alaska would be included in 
the group of eligible age of majority students, regardless of 
their chronological age. 
Another group of students that are below the age of major-
ity but have greater rights than other children are emanci-
pated minors. 62 Although the definition of emancipated minor 
varies from state to state, a child is generally considered to be 
emancipated based on circumstances such as being married or 
in the armed services, maintaining a separate residence with 
no intention of returning to the parental home, or achieving fi-
nancial independence.63 Under state law, emancipated minors 
may be considered to have reached the age of majority in order 
to consent to medical treatment, to enter into a contract, or to 
enroll in school.64 However, emancipated minors are not enti-
tled to all of the rights granted to an age of majority person. 
Some rights, like the right to vote, are based exclusively on 
chronological age. An emancipated minor will not be permitted 
to exercise such chronologically based rights until reaching the 
statutory age. The procedures used to determine whether a 
child is an emancipated minor also vary from state to state. In 
some states a child must be declared an emancipated minor via 
a court proceeding. 65 In other states, no such proceeding exists. 
Instead, public agencies determine whether a child should be 
considered an emancipated minor for a specific purpose, like 
receiving public assistance.66 
Whether through a legal determination or otherwise, states 
should ascertain whether their age of majority definition in-
cludes "independent" children who are married or otherwise 
emancipated minors. If the definition does not include such 
61. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.993(a)(2) (1999). 
62. For an in·depth discussion of various issues regarding emancipation of mi-
nors, see, for example, William E. Dean, Ireland v. Ireland: Judicial Emancipation of 
Minors in Idaho: Protecting the Best Interest of the Child or Conferring a Windfall 
Upon Parents? 31 IDAHO L. REV. 205 (1994); Gregory A. Loken, "Thrownaway" Chil-
dren and Throwaway Parenthood, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1715 (1995); Carol Sanger & Ela-
nor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modem Times, 25 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 239 (1992). 
63. See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 145.62 (1999); JAMES M. MORRISSEY, RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN NEW YORK: A GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS & HUMAN 
SERVICE PROVIDERS 18-19 (3d ed. 1997). 
64. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 25-5-25 (Michie 1999). 
65. See, id. § 25-5-26. 
66. See, e.g., MORRISSEY, supra note 63, at 18-19. 
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children, states should consider whether to amend their exist-
ing definitions. In the event that an "independent" minor has 
not attained the age of majority, states should consult their 
surrogate parent law to determine whether a surrogate parent 
must be appointed to represent the student for IDEA purposes. 
C. Students Who are Determined to Be Incompetent 
Even when a state has established the procedural rights 
will transfer to an age of majority student, the IDEA prohibits 
transfer to students who are declared incompetent under state 
law.67 Legal incompetence is defined by state law and varies 
from state to state. Typically, the definition includes the inca-
pacity to make responsible decisions due to mental or physical 
disabilities or illnesses, or due to drug addiction or inebriety.68 
Regardless of any state differences in defining incompe-
tence, an elevated standard of clear and convincing proof of in-
competence is generally required since fundamental liberty in-
terests are at stake.69 Thus, petitioning parents or petitioning 
school districts should be prepared to present persuasive evi-
dence of the student's incompetence in various aspects of life. If 
the student is found to be incompetent, then either a parent or 
a surrogate parent must represent the student for as long as 
the student remains IDEA-eligible. 
D. Students Who are Unable to Provide Informed Consent 
IDEA's special rule requires the appointment of a "parent" 
to represent an age of majority student when the student is de-
termined incapable of providing informed consent. 70 The regu-
lations also require that a mechanism for determining in-
formed consent be in place in order for a state to use the special 
rule.71 The type of mechanism is a matter of state law. Argua-
bly, a state may require a court to make a legal determination 
of "lesser" competency or, may permit a less formal procedure 
where an IEP team or hearing examiner makes the determina-
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
68. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-305(3) (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
30.1-26-01(2) (1999); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 342.66(11) (West 1998). 
69. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE§ 1801.3(e) (Deering 1999). 
70. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.517 (1999). 
71. See id. § 300.517(b). 
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tion. 72 
In the event that a state requires a court to make a legal 
determination of lesser competency, the student is most likely 
entitled to the same rights as a person in a full competency 
proceeding. 73 Court proceedings which permit a finding of 
"lesser" competence already exist in most states.74 In such pro-
ceedings, the court makes a finding limited to a specific area 
like education. In addition, the court typically not only deter-
mines incompetence but also appoints a "limited" guardian or 
conservator. 75 
However, a state may chose to institute a less formal proce-
dure for determining whether a student can provide informed 
consent regarding educational decisions. Presently, at least one 
state, Idaho, allows for a less formal procedure than a legal 
lesser-competency proceeding to determine whether a student 
is capable of providing informed consent. In Idaho, rights 
transfer to the student at age eighteen unless the student is in-
competent or "an individualized education program team de-
termines the student lacks the ability to provide informed con-
sent with respect to his educational program."76 
Although Congress probably intended a less formal proce-
dure than a court proceeding to determine whether a student is 
capable of providing informed consent with regard to educa-
tional decisions, an IEP team determination may be too infor-
mal. One possible compromise may be to define the mechanism 
to be used for the special rule as a due process hearing. How-
ever, as with most issues relating to transfer of rights, this 
policy matter is left to state control. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In practice, states may be more concerned with an array of 
other special education topics, 77 including discipline 78 and re-
72. Generally, the word competency implies a judicial proceeding. However, as-
suming that Congress did not intend for parents to obtain a court order to use the "spe-
cial rule," a less formal procedure may be appropriate. 
73. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE§ 1801.3(d). 
74. See id.; FLA. STAT. ch. 744.102(8)(a) (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-305(3) 
(1998). 
75. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-101(3) (Michie 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE § 
1801.3(d). FLA. STAT. ch. 744.102(8)(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-305(3). 
76. IDAHO CODE§ 33-2002(4) (1998). 
77. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Law Update VI, 133 ED. LAW REP. 
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imbursement disputes.79 As a result some states neglect to ad-
dress the issue of whether to transfer rights to IDEA-eligible 
age-of- majority students. Although the transfer provision may 
only impact a small number of students, its effect may be sig-
nificant to all parties involved. Specifically, a state's silence is 
likely to cause confusion and friction for school districts, par-
ents, and students as to the rights of parents vis-a-vis age of 
majority students. Parents in support of the claim that they re-
tain their IDEA-rights will point to the IDEA, which arguably 
preserves their rights unless state law transfers such rights to 
student. Conversely, student advocates will assert that legally 
competent adult students are entitled to make their own edu-
cational decisions independent of their parents. The existing 
case law does not lend any further assistance regarding this 
matter. In the absence of state legislation, tension and dis-
agreement over each party's role will continue, which is not in 
anyone's best interest, including that of the so-called "child". 
323 (1999). The previous five updates appeared at 116 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1997), 98 ED. 
LAW REP. 1 (1995), 83 ED. LAW REP. 543 (1993), 66 ED. LAW REP. 901 (1991), 56 ED. 
LAW REP. 20 (1990). 
78. See, e.g., Joseph R. McKinney, Disciplining Children With(Out) Disabilities: 
Schools Behind the Eight Ball, 130 ED. LAW REP. [365] (1999); Perry A. Zirkel, The 
IDEA's Suspension/ Expulsion Requirements, 134 ED.LAW REP. 19 (1999). 
79. See, e.g., Cindy L. Skaruppa eta!., Tuition Reimbursement for Parent's Uni-
lateral Placement of Students in Private Institutions: Justified or Not? 114 ED .. LAW 
REP. 353 (1997). Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition Reimbursement for Special Education Stu-
dents, 7 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 122 (1997). 
